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1 Introduction
The so-called hold-up problem, according to which parties may have insuf-
ficient incentives to make relationship-specific investments in the absence
of contractual safeguards, is a central ingredient of the property rights
approach to the theory of the firm.1 Several authors have investigated
whether hold-up problems can be solved by writing suitable ex ante con-
tracts.2 The present paper adds to this literature by considering a novel
variant of a hold-up problem in which the investing party has private infor-
mation about a quality parameter that directly enters its trading partner’s
utility (i.e., there are common values).
Specifically, consider two risk-neutral parties, a (potential) buyer and a
(potential) seller. When the parties first meet, they are still symmetrically
informed, and there are no relevant wealth constraints. The parties can
write a complete contract regarding the terms of trade of a good that the
seller produces after the contract is written. While producing the good, the
seller can make unobservable relationship-specific investments that stochas-
tically influence the quality of the good. Only the seller learns the realized
quality. Finally, the good can be exchanged and payments can be made
according to the contract. While it is always ex post eﬃcient to trade, the
seller can consume the good herself when no trade occurs, and both parties
prefer to consume a good that has a high quality.
Can the parties implement first-best eﬀort and trade levels by writing
an appropriate contract? If not, what does the second best look like? At
first sight, one might suspect that the answers to these questions should be
well known, because the problem seems to be one of the most basic settings
a contract theorist could imagine. However, to the best of my knowledge,
1See the seminal contributions of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990); see also Hart (1995) for a comprehensive exposition. While the property rights
approach was developed to discuss vertical integration in the context of private firms,
in the meantime it has also been fruitfully applied to analyze the pros and cons of
privatization, see e.g. Hart et al. (1997) and Hoppe and Schmitz (2010a).
2See e.g. Hart and Moore (1988, 1999), Rogerson (1992), Maskin and Tirole (1999),
Tirole (1999), and Hart (1995, ch. 4). See also Hoppe and Schmitz (2009) for the first
study that investigates experimentally whether contracts can solve the hold-up problem.
2
this simple problem has not yet been analyzed in the literature. It turns
out that the model has some interesting properties that might make it a
useful building block in future contract-theoretic research.
Specifically, the first best could clearly be achieved if eﬀort were verifi-
able (the parties would agree to always trade and contractually prescribe
the ex ante eﬃcient eﬀort level). Moreover, if eﬀort were hidden but qual-
ity were verifiable, the first best could also be achieved (the parties would
make the seller a residual claimant). Yet, we will see that it is impossi-
ble to simultaneously achieve ex post eﬃciency (i.e., always trade) and to
implement high eﬀort when eﬀort is a hidden action and quality is private
information of the seller. The impossibility result is very simple to prove
but novel.
One of the most famous impossibility results in the contract-theoretic
literature is due to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).3 They show that in
general it is impossible to achieve ex post eﬃcient voluntary trade when
the buyer and the seller have independently distributed private information
about their types, provided that it is ex ante uncertain whether or not the
good should be traded.4 However, their impossibility result does not hold if
the parties can write a contract ex ante (i.e., before they learn their types),
as has been shown by d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979), Arrow (1979),
and Crémer and Riordan (1985). Another celebrated impossibility result
is Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons” problem (see also Samuelson, 1984, and My-
erson, 1985). In this problem, there are common values; i.e., the seller has
private information about the quality of the good, which determines both
the seller’s and the buyer’s valuation. Even though it is common knowl-
edge that the buyer’s valuation is always larger than the seller’s valuation,
3See also the two-types version in Matsuo (1989), that captures the economic essence
of the impossibility result in an accessible way. For generalizations of the impossibility
result, see Krishna and Perry (1998) and Williams (1999). Moreover, see Klibanoﬀ
and Morduch (1995) for a related impossibility result where only one party has private
information.
4On possibility and impossibility results in frameworks with precontractual private
information, see also Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) and the more recent
work by Schmitz (2002a), Schweizer (2006), Grüner (2008), and Segal and Whinston
(2010).
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it may be impossible to achieve ex post eﬃcient voluntary trade. Yet, this
impossibility result also does not hold when the contract is written before
the quality is realized (the parties would then simply agree to always trade).
Another impossibility result that is related to the one presented here is
due to Schmitz (2002b). In that model, only the buyer learns his valuation
after the seller has invested unobservable eﬀort. Hence, the impossibility
result obtained there does not involve any common values. Moreover, it
is weaker than the one in the present paper, because it crucially relies on
the assumption that there is no third party who could act as a budget
breaker.5 This assumption may be diﬃcult to justify in a setting that
otherwise assumes complete contracting.6
An important advantage of the impossibility result in the present paper
in comparison to impossibility results that rely on precontractual private
information is the fact that here it clearly makes sense to look for the second
best. As has been discussed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 289), the
second-best (i.e., ex ante optimal) contract in a model with precontractual
private information such as Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) is diﬃcult
to interpret, because it is unclear why the parties should be interested in
maximizing their ex ante expected total surplus when they meet after they
have already learned their types.7 In these models, the bargaining protocol
of the contract negotiation stage will determine not only the division of the
cake, but also the size of the cake.
In contrast, in the present model the parties are still symmetrically
informed when the contract is written. Hence, regardless of the bargaining
protocol, they will agree on a contract the maximizes the expected total
5Another well-known impossibility result that relies on the assumption that there is
no third party is Holmström’s (1982) moral-hazard-in-teams problem. In the determin-
istic version of his model, the first best could even be achieved in the absence of a budget
breaker, if the parties could commit to burn money oﬀ the equilibrium path.
6Other reasons why the first best might be impossible to achieve that have been
discussed in the complete contracting literature include risk aversion and wealth con-
straints, on which the present model does not rely. See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002)
for an excellent textbook exposition of the traditional principal-agent theory.
7Recall that they would implement the first best if they met already before they
learned their types.
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surplus. The parties’ bargaining powers determine only the division of the
cake, but not its size. Therefore, the second-best analysis is easier to justify
in the present setting.
Interestingly, it will turn out that the second best is characterized by
distortions that are reminiscent of models with precontractual private in-
formation (i.e., adverse selection). In particular, while trade is always ex
post eﬃcient when the quality is low, there is a downward distortion of
the trade level when the quality (and thus the seller’s opportunity cost) is
high, provided that high eﬀort is implemented. In contrast, if the seller’s
eﬀort costs are suﬃciently large, then low eﬀort is implemented but ex post
eﬃciency is achieved.
The present paper is related to the literature on contractual solutions
to the hold-up problem.8 In particular, Rogerson (1992) considered a com-
plete contracting model in which the parties can commit not to renegotiate
and showed that the first best is achievable, even if the parties have pri-
vate information (see also Konakayama et al., 1986, and Hermalin and
Katz, 1993). Yet, he considered investments with no direct externalities
and he assumed private independent types,9 while the present paper con-
siders the case of common values. In an important paper, Che and Hausch
(1999) have shown that if the parties can commit not to renegotiate, then
the first best can be achieved even if the seller’s investment influences the
buyer’s valuation. However, Che and Hausch (1999) consider the case of
symmetric information, while in the present paper the seller obtains pri-
vate information about quality and thus the first best cannot be achieved
despite commitment.10 Finally, the hold-up problem is a central ingre-
8See Schmitz (2001) for a more extensive survey of this literature. More recent
contributions to the literature highlighting the relevance of hold-up problems in vari-
ous contexts include e.g. Guriev (2003), Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2003), Kessler and
Lülfesmann (2006), Annen (2009), Bester (2009), Froeb and Ganglmair (2009), Strem-
itzer (2010), and Hoppe and Schmitz (2010b).
9See also Farrell and Gibbons (1995), who identify a trade-oﬀ between information
revelation and investment incentives. Yet, their model is driven by precontractual private
information. See Schmitz (2008c) for a hold-up problem with endogenous information
acquisition.
10If renegotiation cannot be ruled out and the seller’s investment influences the buyer’s
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dient of the incomplete contracting literature, where the enforceability of
some contractual clauses (e.g., clauses that rule out future renegotiations)
or even of all contractual arrangements is ruled out by assumption.11 The
most prominent application of incomplete contracting is the property rights
approach to the theory of the firm. While most papers in this literature
assume symmetric information, Schmitz (2006) has recently incorporated
hidden information into Hart’s (1995) property rights model.12 Yet, this
paper did not consider the case of common values.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the
basic model is introduced. In the basic model, it is always ex post eﬃcient
to trade. Nevertheless, it is shown in section 3 that the first best cannot
be achieved whenever it is required to implement high eﬀort. The second
best, on which the parties in the present setting have a common interest
to agree, is characterized in section 4. Moreover, to illustrate a potential
application of our model, it is shown that a buyer might prefer to contract
with a seller who is known to have smaller success probabilities than an
alternative seller (both given high and given low eﬀort). We will also briefly
discuss renegotiation in our context. Finally, the cases in which depending
on the realized quality it may be ex post eﬃcient not to trade are analyzed
in section 5. Some concluding remarks follow in section 6.
2 The model
Consider a (potential) seller and a (potential) buyer, who meet at some
initial date 0, when they are still symmetrically informed. Both parties
are risk-neutral and there are no (binding) wealth constraints. The seller
valuation, Maskin and Moore (1999) have shown that contracting is useless. This result
has also been further generalized by Che and Hausch (1999). See Lyon and Rasmusen
(2004) for a discussion of their assumptions regarding renegotiation.
11For surveys of this literature, see Schwartz (1998), Tirole (1999), and Schmitz (2001).
12See also Schmitz (2008a,b). Taking private information into account brings the
property rights approach closer to transaction cost economics; indeed, Williamson (2000,
2002) has criticized the property rights theory since it typically neglects ex post ineﬃ-
ciencies. Note that ex post ineﬃciencies cannot only be explained by private information,
but also by behavioral eﬀects (see Hart and Moore, 2008, and Hart, 2008, 2009).
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and the buyer can write a contract regarding the terms of trade of an
indivisible good that can be produced at date 1 and exchanged at date 2.
In accordance with the traditional principal-agent (or mechanism design)
approach, it is assumed throughout that the parties can write a complete
contract in the sense of Tirole (1999). In particular, they can rule out
future renegotiation.13 Note that this assumption can only strengthen our
impossibility result.
At date 1, the seller decides how much eﬀort to exert while producing
the good (i.e., she can make a relationship-specific investment). She can
either shirk (e = el) or work hard (e = eh), where 0 ≤ el < eh < 1. Her
disutility of eﬀort is given by c(e), where c(el) = 0 and c(eh) = c > 0.14 The
quality of the good produced is determined by the seller’s eﬀort level and
the state of the world, which is realized at date 1.5. Specifically, assume
that the quality is high (q = h) with probability e and low (q = l) with
probability 1 − e. At date 2, trade can occur and payments can be made
according to the contract.
The buyer’s value from receiving the good is denoted by vq, where 0 <
vl < vh. If trade does not occur, the seller consumes the good. Her value
is denoted by wq, where 0 < wl < wh.
Assumption 1. Trade is always ex post eﬃcient (wl < vl and wh < vh).
In other words, while both parties prefer to consume a good that has a
high quality, it is common knowledge that the buyer’s value is always larger
than the seller’s value. It turns out that this is the most interesting case
(the other conceivable parameter constellations will be analyzed in section
5).
Let x ∈ [0, 1] denote the level of trade and let tB and tS denote the
payments that the buyer and the seller receive, respectively.15 While all
13See section 4.2 for a more detailed discussion regarding renegotiation.
14The assumption c(el) = 0 is made for expositional simplicity only. It is straightfor-
ward to extend the model to the case in which there are additional costs cl > 0 that are
always incurred (i.e., even if eﬀort is low).
15In accordance with Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and many subsequent papers,
the good is assumed to be indivisible, so the trade level is a probability. Alternatively,
one could imagine that the good is divisible and there is a capacity constraint of 1.
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of our results would go through if we simply assumed tB ≡ −tS, we allow
money burning and the inclusion of third parties that can break the budget;
i.e., we assume only that E[tB + tS] ≤ 0 must hold in equilibrium. Notice
that this only strengthens our impossibility result.16
The payoﬀs of the buyer and the seller are given by
uB = tB + xvq,
uS = tS + (1− x)wq − c(e).
If the parties do not agree on a contract, their reservation utilities are given
by zero.17 Recall that at date 0, the parties are still symmetrically informed
and there are no wealth constraints. Hence, in accordance with the Coase
Theorem, they always write a contract that maximizes their expected to-
tal surplus. They can divide the surplus with the help of appropriate lump
sum components of the payments (or, equivalently, additional up-front pay-
ments).
The first-best benchmark. If eﬀort were verifiable, the parties would
write a contract according to which the good is always traded and the seller
must choose
eFB ∈ argmax evh + (1− e) vl − c(e).
Depending on the parties’ bargaining powers, the buyer would pay to the
seller a lump sum amount tS = −tB ∈ [c(eFB), eFBvh+(1−eFB)vl], so that
16Recall that in the literature there are impossibility results that do not hold if one
allows money burning or budgets that are unbalanced ex post (or oﬀ-equilibrium) only.
Note that if the parties can commit to ex post ineﬃcient trade (which is a standard
assumption in adverse selection models), it is not obvious why commitment to ineﬃcient
money burning should be ruled out a priori. Similarly, if the courts enforce only publicly
registered contracts, collusive side agreements are not enforceable, hence the inclusion
of third parties as budget breakers should not be ruled out a priori.
17This assumption is justified if the buyer has to contribute a relationship-specific
investment (which for simplicity causes no costs), so that the seller cannot produce the
good in the absence of the buyer. For example, the buyer might own a blueprint for the
(innovative) good. Notice that only the intervals in which the transfer payments must
lie would change if we assumed instead that the seller could produce the good without
the buyer’s consent, so that the seller’s reservation utility would be max{ewh + (1 −
e)wl − c(e)}.
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voluntary participation by both parties is ensured. Note that if
vh − vl >
c
eh − el
,
then eFB = eh. In other words, high instead of low eﬀort should be exerted
if the costs of doing so, c, are smaller than the increase in probability that
the quality will be high, eh − el, times the buyer’s additional willingness-
to-pay when the quality is high, vh − vl.
It should be emphasized that even when eﬀort is a hidden action, the
first best would still be attained if quality were verifiable. In this case, the
parties would write a contract which says that the good is always traded and
tS = −tB = vq−const, where const ∈ [0, eFBvh+(1−eFB)vl−c(eFB)]. Thus,
the seller’s expected payoﬀ at date 1 would be evh+(1− e) vl−c(e)−const
and as a residual claimant she would choose the first-best eﬀort level.
To summarize, if there were only hidden information or only hidden
action, then the parties would always write a contract that implements
the first best. In contrast, we will see in the following section that the
simultaneous presence of hidden action and hidden information leads to an
impossibility result.
3 A new and simple impossibility result
In what follows, the eﬀort choice e is a hidden action and (as is the case in
the standard lemons model of Akerlof, 1970) the quality q will be private
information of the seller. In accordance with the traditional complete con-
tracting (or mechanism design) approach, it is assumed throughout that
the courts enforce contracts specifying trade and payment rules (x, tB, tS)
which are based on verifiable variables (including messages sent by the
parties).
Due to the revelation principle (cf. Myerson, 1982), the analysis can be
confined to direct revelation mechanisms.18 Such a mechanism prescribes
18It should be noted that it is implicitly assumed that the actual quality will never be
observable by the buyer (or at least not in a timeframe in which contractual payments
could still be prescribed). This assumption is implicitly made in almost all models with
common (i.e., interdependent) values (including Akerlof’s lemons market), even though
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a trade level x (q˜) and payments tB (q˜) , tS (q˜) contingent on the seller’s
announcement of the quality, q˜. For notational simplicity, let (xl, tBl , t
S
l )
and (xh, tBh , t
S
h) denote the alternatives between which the seller can choose
by announcing q˜ = ql or q˜ = qh. The incentive compatibility conditions
which make truth-telling an optimal strategy for the seller are
tSh + (1− xh)wh ≥ tSl + (1− xl)wh, (TTh)
tSl + (1− xl)wl ≥ tSh + (1− xh)wl. (TTl)
The seller is willing to choose the high level of eﬀort whenever
eh
¡
tSh + (1− xh)wh
¢
+ (1− eh)
¡
tSl + (1− xl)wl
¢
− c
≥ el
¡
tSh + (1− xh)wh
¢
+ (1− el)
¡
tSl + (1− xl)wl
¢
,
which is equivalent to
tSh − tSl + (1− xh)wh − (1− xl)wl ≥
c
eh − el
. (IC)
If the eﬀort choice e is to be implemented, the buyer’s and the seller’s
participation constraints read
e
¡
tBh + xhvh
¢
+ (1− e)
¡
tBl + xlvl
¢
≥ 0, (PCB)
e
¡
tSh + (1− xh)wh
¢
+ (1− e)
¡
tSl + (1− xl)wl
¢
− c(e) ≥ 0, (PCS)
and ex ante budget balance requires that
e(tBh + t
S
h) + (1− e)(tBl + tSl ) ≤ 0. (BB)
It is easy to see that the first best will be achieved if eFB = el. However,
if high eﬀort is first-best, then an impossibility result holds.
Proposition 1 (a) If vh−vl ≤ c/(eh−el), then the parties will implement
the first best.
(b) If vh − vl > c/(eh − el), so that eFB = eh, then it is impossible to
achieve the first best.
only some authors mention it explicitly; see e.g. Myerson (1985, p. 131) or Samuelson
(1984, p. 997). If this assumption is not made, then the mechanism of Mezzetti (2004)
could be used, in which the buyer reports the quality after he has learned it. See Jehiel
and Moldovanu (2006) for a criticism of this kind of mechanism.
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Proof. (a) If vh − vl ≤ c/(eh − el), then the parties agree on a contract
xl = xh = 1 (so that ex post eﬃciency is achieved) and tSl = t
S
h = −tBl =
−tBh ∈ [0, elvh+(1− el) vl]. Hence, participation by both parties is ensured
and the seller chooses e = el, which maximizes the expected total surplus.
(b) In the first-best solution, xl = xh = 1. Hence, the incentive compat-
ibility constraint (IC) that ensures high eﬀort reads tSh − tSl ≥ c/(eh − el),
while the truth-telling constraint for the low-quality case (TTl) reads tSl ≥
tSh . It is impossible to satisfy both constraints simultaneously.
Intuitively, given that the good will always be traded, the seller will ex-
ert high eﬀort only if she gets a suﬃciently larger payment when the quality
is high. Yet, the seller will truthfully reveal a low quality only if she does
not get a lower payment when the quality is low. Thus, it is impossible to
simultaneously solve the hidden action and the hidden information prob-
lem. Notice that (in contrast to Schmitz, 2002b) the impossibility result
does not rely on an assumption according to which there is no third party
who could act as a budget breaker.
4 The second best
As has already been pointed out, at date 0 the (symmetrically informed)
parties will always agree on a contract that maximizes their expected total
surplus. When the first best cannot be achieved, we thus have to look
for the second best, which maximizes the parties’ expected total surplus
subject to all incentive constraints. The parties implement the second
best regardless of their bargaining powers. Hence, in contrast to adverse
selection models, we do not have to specify who oﬀers the contract, which
here aﬀects only the division of the surplus.
Let a threshold cost level be defined by
cˆ =
(eh − el)2(vh − vl)(wh − wl)
eh(vh − wl)− el(wh − wl)
.
The second best can then be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 Consider the case vh − vl > c/(eh − el), so that eFB = eh
and the first best cannot be achieved. In the second-best solution, the parties
implement the following eﬀort and trade levels.
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• If c ≥ cˆ, then low eﬀort is implemented, eSB = el, while ex post
eﬃciency is achieved, xSBl = x
SB
h = 1.
• If c < cˆ, then high eﬀort is implemented, eSB = eh. Moreover, xSBl =
1 and
xSBh = 1−
c
(eh − el)(wh − wl)
,
so that there is a downward distortion of the trade level if and only if
the quality is high.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps.
(i) Assume first that the parties want to implement e = eh. At date
0, the parties design a contract (xl, xh, tSl , t
S
h , t
B
l , t
B
h ) in order to maximize
their expected total surplus
eh
£
wh + xh(vh − wh) + tBh + tSh
¤
+ (1− eh)
£
wl + xl(vl − wl) + tBl + tSl
¤
− c
subject to (TTh), (TTl), (IC), (PCB), (PCS), (BB), and the constraints
that xh and xl must lie in the unit interval. The truth-telling constraints
can be rewritten as
tSh − tSl ≥ (xh − xl)wh, (TTh)
tSh − tSl ≤ (xh − xl)wl, (TTl)
which implies xh ≤ xl. Note that (BB) must be binding, because otherwise
tBl and t
B
h could be increased without violating any side constraints.
Let us first ignore the constraints (TTh), (PCB), (PCS), and 0 ≤ xh ≤
1. The simplified problem is thus to choose (xl, xh, tSl , t
S
h) in order to max-
imize
eh [wh + xh(vh − wh)] + (1− eh) [wl + xl(vl − wl)]− c
subject to
tSh − tSl ≤ (xh − xl)wl, (TTl)
tSh − tSl ≥
c
eh − el
− (1− xh)wh + (1− xl)wl, (IC)
and 0 ≤ xl ≤ 1. Note that tSh and tSl do not appear in the objective
function, so we can replace (TTl) and (IC) by
c
eh − el
− (1− xh)wh + wl ≤ xhwl.
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Hence, if c > (eh − el)(1− xh)(wh − wl), then e = eh cannot be imple-
mented. It follows that if c > (eh − el)(wh − wl), so that even with xh = 0
it is impossible to implement high eﬀort, then eSB = el must hold.
Consider now the remaining case c ≤ (eh − el)(wh − wl). High eﬀort
can then be implemented if xh is made suﬃciently small. Notice that the
parties want to set xh as large as possible, because vh > wh. The largest
value of xh such that the seller is still willing to exert high eﬀort is given
by c = (eh − el)(1− xh)(wh − wl), which can be rewritten as
xh = 1−
c
(eh − el)(wh − wl)
.
Moreover, xl = 1 must hold in the optimal solution, because vl > wl.
The transfer payments can be chosen such that tBh = −tSh , tBl = −tSl ,
tSh = t
S
l −
c
(eh − el)(wh − wl)
wl,
and
tSl ∈ [−
el
eh − el
c, ehvh + (1− eh) vl −
vh − wl
(eh − el)(wh − wl)
ehc].
It is straightforward to check that then all of the omitted constraints (TTh),
(PCB), (PCS), and 0 ≤ xh ≤ 1 are satisfied, so that in fact we have found
the optimal solution to the original problem.
(ii) Assume now that the parties implement e = el. It is easy to see
that it is optimal to set xl = xh = 1, and all constraints are satisfied for
e = el if tSh = t
S
l = −tBh = −tBl ∈ [0, elvh + (1− el) vl].
(iii) When the parties implement e = el, the expected total surplus is
elvh + (1− el) vl.
When they implement e = eh, which is possible only if c ≤ (eh−el)(wh−wl),
then the expected total surplus is
ehvh + (1− eh) vl − c−
vh − wh
(eh − el)(wh − wl)
ehc,
where the last term is the loss due to the distortion xh < 1. Hence, high
eﬀort leads to a larger expected total surplus if c < cˆ. Note that cˆ ≤
(eh − el)(wh − wl). The proposition thus follows immediately.
13
According to Proposition 2, there are two cases. First, if the eﬀort costs
are large, the parties implement low eﬀort and achieve ex post eﬃciency.
Second, if the eﬀort costs are suﬃciently small, they implement high eﬀort.
However, this is only possible if the trade level is distorted downwards
whenever the quality (and hence the seller’s opportunity cost) is high. In
this case, the seller is willing to invest high eﬀort in the production of the
good, because she directly benefits from a high quality level when the good
is not exchanged.
4.1 An application: Why a principal might hire an
inexperienced agent
Let us now briefly consider an interesting implication of the second-best
solution. Assume that the buyer (who is the principal) can contract with
one of two sellers (i.e., agents), A or B. Seller A is a more experienced
producer than seller B, so that even if she shirks, seller A will produce
a high-quality good with probability eAl , which is larger than seller B’s
probability of producing a high-quality good when she shirks, eBl . Similarly,
seller A may also produce high quality with a larger probability than seller
B when the eﬀort level is high. Apart from that, the sellers are identical.
At first sight, one might suspect that the buyer should always prefer to
contract with the more experienced seller A. Yet, this is not the case.
Corollary 1 Assume that the buyer can contract with either seller A or
seller B, where eAl > e
B
l and e
A
h > e
B
h . The sellers are identical otherwise.
If eAh − eAl < eBh − eBl , then the buyer may prefer to contract with seller B.
In order to see this, note that when high eﬀort is implemented, the loss
due to the distortion (see the proof of Proposition 2) is given by (vh −
wh)ehc/(eh − el)(wh − wl), which is increasing in el. Hence, if eAh = eBh ,
then the expected total surplus is larger when the buyer contracts with the
unexperienced seller B. By continuity, there are also cases in which this
remains true even when in addition eAh > e
B
h .
19 Intuitively, if eAh−eAl < eBh −
19For example, let vh = 10, vl = 6, wh = 4, wl = 2, c = .1, eAh = .9, e
B
h = .8, e
A
l = .6,
eBl = .2. It is straightforward to verify that the parties will implement high eﬀort and
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eBl , then it is relatively cheaper to motivate agent B to exert high instead
of low eﬀort, and the smaller agency costs of agent B can overcompensate
the fact that the levels of agent A’s success probabilities are larger. Notice
that the Corollary holds even though complete contracts can be written;
i.e., in particular it does not rely on an assumption according to which
renegotiation cannot be ruled out.
4.2 A remark on renegotiation
In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether
or not one should assume that renegotiation can be ruled out. In the
main part of the present paper, we follow the mechanism design literature
on (im)possibility results in adverse selection frameworks (in the tradition
of Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) as well as Rogerson’s (1992) semi-
nal work on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem, in which it is
assumed that renegotiation can be excluded. Indeed, in a complete con-
tracting world, all contractual clauses based on verifiable events should be
enforceable, including clauses that rule out renegotiation.20 Specifically,
Maskin and Tirole (1999) criticize that in the recent incomplete contract-
ing literature, the assumption that renegotiation cannot be prevented is
motivated by considerations that lie outside the existing models. In con-
trast, Hart and Moore (1999) argue that in practice it may be impossible
to enforce contractual clauses that rule out renegotiation.21
In an otherwise complete contracting world, the impossibility to rule
out renegotiation can only impose additional constraints and hence reduce
the expected total surplus that the parties can generate. Since the result
of future renegotiation can always be included in the initial contract, the
that the expected total surplus is 8. 6 if the buyer contracts with the experienced seller
A, while the expected total surplus is 8. 7 if the buyer contracts with the unexperienced
seller B.
20As has been pointed out by Maskin and Tirole (1999, p. 99), the parties could
register their contract publicly, i.e. the contract is lodged in court (Tirole, 1999, p. 746).
21See also the dialogue between a “complete contract theorist” and an “incomplete
contract theorist” in Tirole (1999, section 2.5). For a law and economics perspective on
this discussion, see Schmitz (2005) and Davis (2006).
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impossibility to exclude renegotiation means that the initial contract has to
satisfy additional renegotiation-proofness constraints. Since in our frame-
work it is common knowledge that it is always ex post eﬃcient to trade, a
contract is renegotiation-proof if trade always takes place, x = 1. However,
if we insist on ex post eﬃciency, we already know from the analysis in sec-
tion 3 that it is impossible to induce high eﬀort, so that only the expected
total surplus elvh + (1− el) vl can be attained.22
5 The cases in which it may be ex post eﬃ-
cient not to trade
So far, we have focused on the case in which it is always ex post eﬃcient
to trade (vh > wh and vl > wl). While this might be the most interesting
case, other parameter constellations are also conceivable. In this section,
we return to our original model in which the parties can write complete
contracts and commit not to renegotiate, but now Assumption 1 no longer
holds. Of course, if vh < wh and vl < wl, then the first best is trivial to
achieve, because trade is never ex post eﬃcient and thus the seller obviously
chooses the first-best eﬀort level. Let us now consider the remaining cases,
in which the ex post eﬃcient trade level depends upon the realized quality.23
Proposition 3 (a) If vh < wh and vl > wl, so that it is ex post eﬃcient
to trade whenever the quality is low, the parties achieve the first best.
(b) If vh > wh and vl < wl, so that it is ex post eﬃcient to trade
whenever the quality is high, it is impossible to achieve the first best.
22Note that alternatively one might assume a specific bargaining game to be played if
the initial contract does not lead to ex post eﬃciency (e.g., one party might make a “take-
it-or-leave-it” oﬀer). But then it is unclear why an ineﬃcient outcome of this bargaining
game (e.g., “leave it”) cannot be renegotiated. See also Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992),
who argue in their Proposition 1 that hardly anything can be implemented if one insists
on renegotiation-proofness of the renegotiation game.
23It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the knife-edge cases vh = wh and/or
vl = wl, where the levels of xl and/or xh are irrelevant for the total surplus. For instance,
if vh = wh and vl = wl, the first best can obviously be achieved (by not trading at all
or by trading whenever the quality is low).
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Proof. (a) If vh < wh and vl > wl, ex post eﬃciency requires xFBh =
0, xFBl = 1. It is ex ante eﬃcient to choose the high level of eﬀort if
ehwh + (1− eh)vl − c ≥ elwh + (1− el)vl, which can be rewritten as (eh −
el)(wh − vl) ≥ c. When the contract prescribes the ex post eﬃcient trade
levels, the seller’s (IC) constraint reads (eh− el)(tSh − tSl +wh) ≥ c. Hence,
the seller makes the desired eﬀort decision if tSh = t
S
l − vl. In this case,
the truth-telling constraints (which require −wh ≤ tSh − tSl ≤ −wl) are
also satisfied. Furthermore, the parties can set tBh = −tSh , tBl = −tSl , and
tSl ∈ [c(eFB)− eFB (wh − vl) , vl], so that budget balance and both parties’
participation constraints are satisfied.
(b) If vh > wh and vl < wl, then xFBh = 1, x
FB
l = 0. It is impossible
to implement ex post eﬃcient trade, because the truth-telling constraints
imply xh ≤ xl (see the proof of Proposition 2).
Intuitively, if it is ex post eﬃcient to trade whenever the quality is low,
there is no trade-oﬀ between ex ante investment incentives and ex post
eﬃciency. The seller can be given the correct incentives to invest quality-
improving eﬀort into the production of the good, because she consumes the
good herself whenever the quality is high.
If it is ex post eﬃcient to trade whenever the quality is high, an ineﬃ-
ciency result holds. It should be emphasized that, in contrast to Proposi-
tion 1b, the impossibility result in Proposition 3b is not novel. In the case
studied in Proposition 3b, it is simply not possible to implement ex post
eﬃcient trade (regardless of whether or not eﬀort is hidden).24 While the
impossibility result thus is less interesting, we still have to characterize the
second-best solution. For this purpose, define a threshold cost level by
c˜ = (eh − el)(wh − wl)min
½
(eh − el)(vh − vl)
ehvh + (1− eh)vl − elwh − (1− el)wl
, 1
¾
.
Proposition 4 Consider the case vh > wh and vl < wl, so that the first
best cannot be achieved. The second-best solution can be characterized as
follows.
24It is well-known that ex post eﬃciency is unattainable when the monotonicity con-
straint implied by incentive compatibility is violated by the ex post eﬃcient trading rule;
see e.g. Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, p. 53).
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• If c ≥ c˜, the parties implement low eﬀort, eSB = el. Moreover, xSBl =
xSBh = 1 if el(vh − wh) + (1− el) (vl − wl) > 0, and xSBl = xSBh = 0
otherwise.
• If c < c˜, the parties implement high eﬀort, eSB = eh. Moreover,
xSBl = x
SB
h = 0 if eh(vh − wh) + (1− eh) (vl − wl) ≤ 0, and
xSBl = x
SB
h = 1−
c
(eh − el)(wh − wl)
otherwise.
Proof. We proceed again in three steps.
(i) In analogy to the proof of Proposition 2, it is again true that eSB =
el must hold if c > (eh − el)(wh − wl). Otherwise, high eﬀort can be
implemented. Recall that the truth-telling constraints imply xh ≤ xl. Since
vl < wl, the parties will now make xl as small as possible, so that xl =
xh = x. Their expected total surplus when they implement high eﬀort is
ehwh + (1− eh)wl + x [eh(vh − wh) + (1− eh) (vl − wl)] − c. Hence, when
they implement high eﬀort, it is optimal for them to choose x = 1−c/(eh−
el)(wh − wl) if eh(vh − wh) + (1− eh) (vl − wl) > 0, and x = 0 otherwise.
Then all constraints are satisfied if
tSh = t
S
l = −tBh = −tBl ∈ [c−(1−x) (ehwh + (1− eh)wl) , x(ehvh+(1− eh) vl)].
(ii) When the parties implement low eﬀort, they will also set xl = xh =
x. It is optimal for them to set x = 1 if el(vh −wh) + (1− el) (vl −wl) > 0
and x = max{0, 1− c/(eh − el)(wh − wl)} otherwise. Then all constraints
are satisfied if
tSh = t
S
l = −tBh = −tBl ∈ [(x− 1) (elwh + (1− el)wl) , x(elvh + (1− el) vl)].
(iii) If c > (eh − el)(wh − wl), the parties implement low eﬀort and the
expected total surplus is
max{elvh + (1− el) vl, elwh + (1− el)wl}.
Consider now the case c ≤ (eh − el)(wh − wl). If the parties implement
e = el, the expected total surplus is
max{elvh+(1− el) vl, elvh+(1− el) vl− el(vh − wh) + (1− el) (vl − wl)
(eh − el)(wh − wl)
c}.
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If they implement e = eh, the expected total surplus is
max{ehvh+(1− eh) vl−eh(vh − wh) + (1− eh) (vl − wl)
(eh − el)(wh − wl)
c, ehwh+(1− eh)wl}−c.
It is thus straightforward to show that the proposition is true.
There are again two cases. If the eﬀort costs are large, low eﬀort is
implemented, while the trade level now does not depend on the quality.
Either the good is always exchanged or it is not traded at all. If the eﬀort
costs are small, high eﬀort is implemented. The trade level again does not
depend on the quality. The good is either kept by the seller or the trade
level is suﬃciently small such that the seller can directly benefit from high
quality and she thus has an incentive to invest eﬀort in the production of
the good.
6 Concluding remarks
Many relevant economic phenomena have been explained in the contract-
theoretic literature by distortions obtained in adverse selection models that
rely on precontractual private information.25 However, there are circum-
stances under which it might be doubtful whether this is the most relevant
source of distortions. For instance, in a long-term relationship between an
owner and a manager, precontractual private information about the man-
ager’s eﬀort costs (as assumed in adverse selection models) may be less
relevant than postcontractual asymmetric information.
In the present paper, it has been illustrated that distortions similar
to the ones known from adverse selection models can also be obtained in
models without precontractual private information, when hidden action and
hidden information are combined. If common values are involved, the dis-
tortions are robust in the sense that even the introduction of third parties
cannot avoid them. Moreover, the model is simple and it has the advantage
that the second-best analysis is relevant, regardless of the bargaining pro-
tocol. Hence, it might be desirable to use the current model as a building
25See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for recent
and comprehensive textbook expositions.
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block in more applied work in order to analyze some of the phenomena
that so far have been addressed only in models with precontractual private
information. In particular, the hold-up problem plays a prominent role in
the theory of the firm. Introducing postcontractual asymmetric informa-
tion about quality into models of the property rights approach to the theory
of the firm might be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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